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NOTE
Fighting Foreign-Corporate Political Access:
Applying Corporate Veil-Piercing Doctrine to
Domestic-Subsidiary Contributions
Ryan Rott*
Campaign finance regulations limit speech. The laws preclude foreign nation-
als, including foreign corporations, from participating in U.S. politics via
campaign contributions. The unusual characteristics of corporations, however,
may allow foreign corporations to exploit a loophole in the regulatory regime.
A foreign corporation may contribute to political campaigns by acquiring a
domestic subsidiary and dominating it. This Note addresses how these unu-
sual corporate behaviors enable foreign corporations to illegally corrupt the
political process. This Note concludes that to close the loophole without violat-
ing the free speech rights of domestic subsidiaries, Congress should enact legis-
lation which would apply corporate veil-piercing theory to the campaign
finance system, reinforcing its legislation with qui tam provisions.
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Introduction
In 1996, as President Clinton sought reelection, scandal threatened him
and the Democratic Party. Many accused the Democrats of illegally selling
political influence to foreigners. The following is an example of the type of
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illegal conduct alleged. In late February, a South Korean electronics com-
pany, Cheong Am Business Group, established a California subsidiary, Che-
ong Am America.1 The next month, the South Korean parent corporation
capitalized the California subsidiary with a $1.3 million bank transfer.2
Shortly thereafter, John H.K. Lee, a South Korean citizen and the chairman
of both the parent and subsidiary corporations, attended a Democratic Na-
tional Committee (DNC) fundraiser and met Clinton.3 Within days, Lee di-
rected Cheong Am America to contribute $250,000 to the DNC.4 Prior to
the contribution, Cheong Am America did not operate and had no income.5
This contribution violated the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), also known as the McCain-Feingold Act,6 which prohibits foreign
nationals from contributing to U.S. elections or candidates.7 Following me-
dia scrutiny, the DNC quickly admitted the contribution was illegal and re-
turned it.8
These events prompted outrage and led to extensive investigation. A
special Department of Justice task force, comprised of ninety prosecutors,
FBI agents, and support staff, investigated millions of documents relating to
the scandal.9 Congress also investigated. The Senate Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs published a report alleging that
The President and his aides demeaned the offices of the President and Vice
President, took advantage of minority groups, pulled down all the barriers
that would normally be in place to keep out illegal contributions, pressured
policy makers, and left themselves open to strong suspicion that they were
selling not only access to high-ranking officials, but policy as well. Millions
of dollars were raised in illegal contributions, much of it from foreign
sources.10
The investigations uncovered evidence of illegal foreign efforts to influence
the U.S. political process.11 They determined that although some foreign ef-
forts seemed “innocuous,” there was likely also “a broad array of [foreign]
1. S. Rep. No. 105-167, at 1702 (1998).
2. Id.
3. Alan C. Miller, Democrats Return Illegal Contribution; Politics: South Korean Subsidi-
ary’s $250,000 Donation Violated Ban on Money from Foreign Nationals, L.A. Times, Sept. 21,
1996, at A16.
4. S. Rep. No. 105-167, at 37.
5. See id. at 1702.
6. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101).
7. Id. § 441e (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30121).
8. Miller, supra note 3.
9. Roberto Suro, Justice Did Not Review Legality of Gore White House Solicitations; Re-
port of ‘Hard Money’ Deposits Prompted Reno to Act, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1997, at A1.
10. S. Rep. No. 105-167, at 3 (1998).
11. E.g., id. at 46–49 (“[T]he DNC’s heedless pursuit of contributions allowed wealthy
and well-connected foreign nationals to arrange almost unlimited access to the President and
other top U.S. policymakers. Time after time, [people] used access to the President to advance
[their] private business interests . . . .”).
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efforts designed to influence U.S. policies and elections through . . . financ-
ing election campaigns.”12 Ultimately, the investigations met dead ends and
the public lost interest.13
Congress has worried about corrupting influences invading politics
since the country’s founding and continues to worry about them today.14 As
early as 1867, Congress regulated campaign finance to that end.15 These reg-
ulations restrict the marketplace to prevent people from buying influence. In
the Cheong Am scandal, for example, the regulatory net caught the illegal
foreign contribution and forced the DNC to return the contribution.16
Recently, however, the Supreme Court overruled some campaign fi-
nance regulations in the name of free speech.17 In doing so, the Court ripped
holes in the regulatory net designed to protect politics from corruption. The
system that remains allows domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations to
contribute to campaigns almost without limits.18 In the 2014 election cycle
alone, domestic subsidiaries, through their Political Action Committees
(PACs), contributed over $19 million to various campaigns or causes.19 That
much money has the potential to corrupt elections by significantly im-
pacting their outcomes.
12. Id. at 47.
13. Marc Lacey, House Probe of Campaign Fund-Raising Uncovers Little, Piles Up Partisan
Ill Will; Congress: GOP Insults, Democratic Ridicule Are Low-lights of Costly Investigation That
Has Spawned 600 Subpoenas but Led Mostly to Dead Ends, L.A. Times, May 2, 1998, at A14
(“Despite issuing a flurry of 600 subpoenas, committee investigators have largely run into dead
end after dead end . . . . The media have largely moved on, and some Republicans who had
regarded the donation scandal as their party’s political battering ram now have lost interest in
the complicated web of allegations.”).
14. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 347 (2009)
(“The Framers of our Constitution considered political corruption a key threat—if not the key
threat—to the young country.”).
15. See Matthew A. Melone, Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech: Did the Su-
preme Court Enhance Political Discourse or Invite Corruption?, 60 DePaul L. Rev. 29, 33 n.24
(2010) (explaining early attempts at regulating campaign finance).
16. See Miller, supra note 3.
17. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
18. Many well-known domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations like UBS Americas
(subsidiary of Switzerland-based UBS AG); BAE Systems (subsidiary of United Kingdom-
based BAE Systems); Sprint Communications (subsidiary of Japan-based Softbank Corp.); and
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA (subsidiary of Israel-based Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries) have
their own Political Action Committees (PACs) and contribute to campaigns. Foreign-Con-
nected PACs, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/foreign.php (last updated
Mar. 9, 2015).
19. Id. One commentator argues this is but a drop in an immense bucket. Scott L. Fried-
man, Note, First Amendment and “Foreign-Controlled” U.S. Corporations: Why Congress Ought
to Affirm Domestic Subsidiaries’ Corporate Political-Speech Rights, 46 Vand. J. Transnat’l L.
613, 625 (2013) (“Domestic subsidiaries’ contributions comprise only a sliver of the magni-
tude of money spent on electoral politics.”). The numbers, however, include only contribu-
tions made by domestic subsidiaries’ PACs and do not chart other contributions. See id. at 624.
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If a domestic subsidiary contributes with its parent’s foreign interests in
mind, the contributions are illegal,20 potentially corrupting, and should be
cause for alarm. This Note does not suggest that all domestic subsidiaries of
foreign corporations are incapable of separating their interests from the for-
eign interests of their parents when they contribute to campaigns, as is re-
quired by law. In many cases, however, a parent company will dominate a
subsidiary to pursue its own interests.21 This Note argues that Congress must
balance free speech rights with the potential for corruption by allowing do-
mestic subsidiaries to contribute in their own interests while precluding
them from doing so in their foreign parents’ interests.
Part I introduces the history of the campaign finance regulatory envi-
ronment and examines the cases that have chipped away at the regulations
and their protections. Part II explains how corporations, through mergers
and acquisitions, may enable foreign corporations to illegally access U.S.
politics. Finally, Part III concludes that adopting legislation that applies a
corporate veil-piercing theory, enforced in part by qui tam provisions, to the
campaign finance system will prevent foreign corporations from accessing
U.S. politics without infringing the free speech rights of domestic
companies.
I. Contributing to the Campaign Finance System
This Part examines the history of campaign finance regulations and in-
troduces the current legal framework regarding corporate and foreign par-
ticipation in campaign finance. Section I.A examines the development of
doctrine on corporate participation in campaigns. Section I.B discusses the
longstanding prohibition on foreign participation in campaign finance. Sec-
tion I.C explains the aftermath of Citizens United.
A. A History of Corporate Campaign Finance Law
U.S. leaders have been particularly concerned with political corruption
since the country’s founding.22 The framers worried that the country’s in-
fancy and size rendered it especially susceptible to corrupting influence.23
They eased their concerns by peppering the Constitution with several an-
ticorruption clauses.24
20. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30121) (preventing indirect contri-
butions in connection with elections).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (holding that a corporate
parent that actively participated in and exerted control over the operations of a subsidiary
could be directly liable for the actions of the subsidiary).
22. See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 14, at 347.
23. Id. at 353.
24. For example, the framers wrote provisions about the size of the legislature with cor-
ruption specifically in mind. See id. at 354 (“One of the most extensive and recurring discus-
sions among the delegates about corruption concerned the size of the various bodies.”). For a
detailed discussion on anticorruption provisions throughout the Constitution, see id. at
354–69.
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Specifically, the framers worried that corporate influences would cor-
rupt U.S. politics. Though there were few corporations in the United States,
the colonists loathed interacting with domineering corporations.25 Corpo-
rate monopolies, for example, prohibited colonists from trading with Native
Americans and other countries’ companies.26 In a memorandum that re-
flects early American perceptions, James Madison wrote, “there is an evil
which ought to be guarded ag[ain]st in the indefinite accumulation of prop-
erty from the capacity of holding it in perpetuity by . . . corporations. The
power of all corporations ought to be limited in this respect.”27 With the
colonial experience in mind, the framers empowered the states to regulate
corporations.28 States prohibited corporations from engaging in any conduct
not expressly provided for in their corporate charters, prevented them from
operating in other states, limited their ability to raise capital, and threatened
to revoke their charters, which would force a corporation to dissolve.29
The framers did not foresee that states would be ill-suited to address the
problems. Eventually, as states competed with each other for corporate tax
revenues, they chipped away at the restrictions and safeguards against cor-
porate powers in a race to the bottom.30 By the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the less-restricted corporations were multiplying and enjoying soaring
revenues.31 Increased revenues enabled corporations to spend more on fed-
eral, state, and local elections.32
Fearing corporate corruption, Congress began an enduring fight to re-
form campaign finance laws comprehensively.33 The first attempt, the Till-
man Act of 1907, banned direct corporate contributions.34 Corporations
could easily evade the ban because it lacked disclosure requirements and
allowed them to reimburse directors who made personal contributions.35
Within a few years, Congress enacted, and later amended, the Publicity Act
25. See Matt A. Vega, The First Amendment Lost in Translation: Preventing Foreign Influ-
ence in U.S. Elections After Citizens United v. FEC, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 951, 966 (2011)
(explaining colonial response to restrictive trade agreements).
26. Id.
27. James Madison, Detached Memoranda (c. 1817), reprinted in Madison’s “De-
tached Memoranda”, 3 Wm. & Mary Q. 534, 556 (Elizabeth Fleet ed., 1946).
28. See Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Juris-
prudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 Quinnipiac
L. Rev. 523, 526–27 (2010).
29. Id. at 532.
30. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557–60 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
31. Vega, supra note 25, at 967.
32. Id. (“As these corporations became wealthier, they increased their spending in fed-
eral, state, and local elections to further their own interests.”).
33. For comprehensive coverage of early congressional attempts at campaign finance re-
form, see id. at 967–71. For a useful timeline of events in campaign finance law, see A Century
of U.S. Campaign Finance Law, NPR (Jan. 21, 2010, 10:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=121293380.
34. Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
35. Vega, supra note 25, at 968.
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to remedy the Tillman Act’s shortcomings.36 The Publicity Act required can-
didates to disclose information relating to funds but it brought little practi-
cal change.37 The Act did not include enforcement measures, so candidates
“almost universally” ignored its requirements.38 Congress needed new com-
prehensive legislation to close these loopholes; it would take over half a
century.
Congress next attempted to overhaul campaign finance with the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).39 “FECA remains the foundational
law of the system: It sets contribution limits, requires disclosure of contribu-
tions and spending, and institutes public financing for presidential elec-
tions.”40 A contribution limit caps what one gives to a particular candidate
or committee, while an expenditure limit caps what one can spend overall
on a given election.41 Meanwhile, an independent expenditure may advocate
for or against a candidate, but must not be connected to any candidate’s
campaign.42 Although the law was imperfect, subsequent amendments reme-
died some of the issues.43 For example, these amendments created the Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC) as a watchdog and enforcer.44
Finally facing a comprehensive and capable campaign finance law, cam-
paign-spending advocates took their cause to the courts.45 In Buckley v.
Valeo, the foundational campaign finance case, the Supreme Court upheld
FECA’s limits on direct contributions to candidates but struck down limits
on expenditures and independent expenditures.46 The Court reasoned, “al-
though the Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate
fundamental First Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose sig-
nificantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expres-
sion and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.”47
36. Publicity Act of 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (repealed 1972), amended by 1911
Amendments to the Publicity Act, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25.
37. Id.; see Justin A. Nelson, Note, The Supply and Demand of Campaign Finance Reform,
100 Colum. L. Rev. 524, 534 (2000).
38. Nelson, supra note 37, at 534–35.
39. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455
(2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30145)).
40. A Century of U.S. Campaign Finance Law, supra note 33.
41. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–60 (1976) (per curiam).
42. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17)). For example,
someone advertising to attack a candidate on her own initiative is an independent expenditure.
See id. Meanwhile, if that candidate’s opponent solicited the advertisement, it would not be an
independent expenditure. See id.
43. Vega, supra note 25, at 971.
44. See id. at 973.
45. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d in
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). FECA, as amended, was “the latest, and by far the most comprehen-
sive, reform legislation passed by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-
President and members of Congress.” Id. at 831.
46. 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam).
47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23.
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Critics lament that Buckley’s reasoning was predicated on an assumption
that money equaled speech.48 Although Buckley did not address corporate
speech, it laid the groundwork for future constitutional challenges to cam-
paign finance reforms. Should the Court find corporate speech warranted
the same protection as individual speech, Buckley would make corporate
expenditure limits unconstitutional.49
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court directly addressed
corporate speech.50 Massachusetts had criminalized corporate expenditures
that influenced votes on referendum proposals.51 Reasoning that individuals
could unquestionably seek to influence these referendum proposals through
expenditures, the Court considered whether corporate speech was entitled to
less protection than individual speech: “The question in this case, simply
put, is whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives th[e] proposed
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection.”52 The
Court held that the Massachusetts criminal statute “amount[ed] to an im-
permissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the
[speaker’s] interests.”53 It did not matter whether the speech came from a
“corporation, association, union, or individual.”54 Although the Court ad-
mitted that corruption is possible with corporate contributions to particular
candidates or committees, it held that those problems do not exist with re-
spect to referendum proposals.55 Bellotti opened the door for more corporate
political involvement.
After Bellotti, Congress amended FECA to codify a soft-money excep-
tion.56 Soft money funds “ ‘party-building’ activities,” as opposed to direct
candidate advocacy.57 “In addition to grassroots campaign activity, soft
48. Brittany Morgan Albaugh, Note, Two Paths to Preventing Foreign Influence: Reforming
Campaign Finance and Lobbying Law, 13 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 283, 287 (2014). But see Michael
Cummins, Money Is Not Speech, Found. for Econ. Educ. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.fee
.org/the_freeman/detail/money-is-not-speech (explaining that it is a “widespread mis-
characterization” to say that Buckley equated money and speech). Even Justice White, in dis-
sent, suggested that the majority was equating money with speech. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 262
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
50. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
51. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767–68.
52. Id. at 777–78.
53. Id. at 784.
54. Id. at 777.
55. Id. at 788 n.26 (“The overriding concern behind the enactment of [campaign-finance
regulations prohibiting corporate speech] was the problem of corruption of elected representa-
tives through the creation of political debts. . . . The case before us presents no comparable
problem, and our consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of general public
interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of participation in a politi-
cal campaign for election to public office.” (citations omitted)).
56. Federal Election Campaign Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339
(1980).
57. Bill Mears, Where the Money Is: A Campaign Spending Primer, CNN (Jan. 23, 2012,
7:19 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/campaign-spending-primer.
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money also funds voter registration drives, phone banks, and get-out-the-
vote efforts conducted by parties.”58 As a consequence of the FECA amend-
ment and Bellotti, corporations could give to parties as long as the money
was soft.
In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Court retreated
from its expansion of corporate speech rights.59 Contrary to the rationale of
Bellotti that corporate money could not corrupt public referenda, only
elected officials, the Court stated in Austin that corporate independent ex-
penditures did raise concerns regarding the corrupting influence of accumu-
lated corporate wealth on elections.60 Specifically, the Court realized,
“[c]orporate wealth can unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in
the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the
guise of political contributions.”61 The Court recognized that this rationale
provided a compelling reason, sufficiently tailored, to restrict corporate ex-
penditures.62 Based on this anticorruption rationale, Austin held that bans
based on corporate speaker identity could be constitutional.63
Although Austin undid some of the damage from Bellotti, Congress
found corporate soft-money abuse remained a problem. In the 1996 elec-
tion, soft-money use tripled as both parties used it to essentially, if not ex-
actly, advocate for or against specific candidates.64 In light of these abuses,
Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),
also known as the McCain-Feingold Act.65 BCRA attempted to improve the
system by limiting soft money.66 Campaign-spending advocates challenged
BCRA in McConnell v. FEC, but the Court upheld it based on the same
anticorruption reasoning in Austin.67
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court flipped its position on corporate
campaign speech again.68 Citizens United overruled Austin and the relevant
part of McConnell, returning to the principles established in Buckley and
Bellotti.69 In doing so, the Court rejected the anticorruption rationale and
58. Campaign Finance Revision: Soft Money: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Rules and Ad-
min., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Bradley A. Smith, Adjunct Scholar, Cato Institute),
1997 WL 2551155.
59. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
60. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60.
61. Id. at 660.
62. Id. at 660–61.
63. Id.
64. Soft Money - A Look at the Loopholes, Wash. Post (1998), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/campfin/intro4.htm. The DNC paid for months of tel-
evision ads that mirrored Clinton’s campaign ads with soft money. See id. The Republican
National Committee (RNC) used soft money for a commercial made by Senator Dole using
footage shot for his campaign. Id.
65. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30101).
66. Id.
67. 540 U.S. 93, 142–69 (2003).
68. 130 S. Ct. 876, 912–14 (2010).
69. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14.
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gutted the corporate restrictions in the BCRA.70 Essentially, Citizens United
diluted the governmental interest to solely an interest in preventing quid pro
quo corruption.71 Because there was no record of quid pro quo corruption
stemming from independent expenditures, the Court found that provisions
limiting those expenditures were unconstitutional.72 The Court reiterated,
“the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or
viewpoints. Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”73 Consequently, legisla-
tion that disfavors corporate speech may not stand.
B. No Foreigners Allowed
The framers were similarly concerned with corruption by foreign influ-
ences, as evidenced by the anticorruption provisions in the Constitution.74
The Nobility Clause, for example, prevents congressmen from accepting gifts
from foreign governments.75 Fear of foreign corruption even engendered bit-
ter bipartisanship in the first Congress; Federalists accused Republicans of
being influenced by the radical French and Republicans accused Federalists
of allying with the British.76
Congress often enacted legislation to allay these concerns. The Foreign
Agents Registration Act, for example, required that agents of foreign govern-
ments disclose their affiliation when participating in politics.77 During the
World War II era, Congress strengthened the Act, providing more stringent
rules against foreign political participation to prevent the spread of Nazi and
Communist propaganda.78 Further amendments criminalized the foreign
use of domestic agents for political contribution.79 As in the corporate con-
text, reform efforts addressing foreign participation in campaign finance
70. Id.
71. See id. at 908–09.
72. Id. at 910–11.
73. Id. at 898 (citation omitted).
74. Teachout, supra note 14, at 357–58, 361–62, 366–67 (“[C]oncern about foreign
power . . . was often intermingled with the fears of corruption.”).
75. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o person holding any Office of Profit or
Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolu-
ment, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”).
76. Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate
Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840, at 89–90 (1969).
77. An Act to Amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 89-486,
§§ 2(4), (6), 80 Stat. 244, 245–46 (1966) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 612(a)(6), (8)
(2012)).
78. An Act to Amend the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 236, § 4, 56 Stat.
248, 255–56 (1942) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 614 (2012)). For an overview of the
history of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, see Vega, supra note 25, at 968–71.
79. Pub. L. No. 89-486, § 8, 80 Stat. 244, 248–49 (repealed 1976). For example, this
prevented foreign individuals from hiring U.S. citizens as agents to make contributions on
their behalf.
490 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:481
were littered with loopholes and setbacks.80 Finally, Congress enacted FECA
and later BCRA, which directly prohibited any “foreign national, directly or
indirectly, [from] mak[ing] a contribution . . . or an expenditure.”81
According to federal courts, the foreign prohibition is more constitu-
tionally sound than the corporate prohibitions. The Supreme Court ex-
pressly avoided reaching the constitutionality of section 441e of the BCRA82
in Citizens United when it gutted the BCRA’s corporate provisions.83 Al-
though the Court did not directly review section 441e, the Court “never cast
doubt on laws that place special restrictions on campaign spending by for-
eign nationals.”84
Nonetheless, section 441e still faced a challenge in court. In Bluman v.
FEC, Bluman, a Canadian associate at a U.S. law firm, and Steiman, a dual
Israeli and Canadian medical resident, wished to contribute money to vari-
ous American political candidates.85 Although they had lawfully resided in
the United States for years and planned to stay several more years, their
desired contributions were barred by section 441e.86 In their complaint they
alleged that they were legally authorized to be in the United States—they
were subject to the laws, paid taxes, and “robustly participate[d] in civic
life.”87 They argued that section 441e criminalized forms of expression that
“constitute[d] core political speech entitled to the strongest protection
under the First Amendment.”88
The D.C. District Court upheld section 441e and dismissed the case.89
The court believed that the constitutionality of section 441e “raise[d] a pre-
liminary and foundational question about the definition of the American
political community and, in particular, the role of foreign citizens in the
U.S. electoral process.”90 The court balanced two competing ideas. First,
80. See Vega, supra note 25, at 970–71. For example, when the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act criminalized the foreign use of agents for political participation, the law only sanc-
tioned the agent and not the foreign principal. Id. at 971. Foreign nationals and corporations
could contribute directly to campaigns. Id.
81. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30121). This section is imple-
mented by regulation. 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2014).
82. References in this Note to “section 441e” are to section 441e of title 2 of the 2012
version of the U.S. code. Section 441e is being relocated, along with several other sections of
titles 2 and 42, to a newly created title 52. See Editorial Reclassification, Title 52, United States
Code, Off. L. Revision Couns., U.S. House Representatives, http://uscode.house.gov/
editorialreclassification/t52/index.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2015).
83. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010) (“We need not reach the question
whether the Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or as-
sociations from influencing our Nation’s political process.”).
84. Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 (D.D.C. 2011).
86. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285.
87. Complaint ¶ 2, Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (No. 110-cv-01766), 2010 WL 4236439.
88. Id. ¶ 28.
89. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285–86, 292.
90. Id. at 286.
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aliens enjoy many constitutional rights in the United States.91 But, the
United States may also deny aliens certain rights and privileges that U.S.
citizens enjoy.92 As long as activities are “intimately related to the process of
democratic self-government,” it is acceptable to exclude foreign citizens.93
The court found the issue straightforward and reasoned that aliens do not
have a right to participate in U.S. elections.94 The Supreme Court’s affirma-
tion of Bluman’s dismissal without opinion solidified section 441e’s consti-
tutionality as applied to foreign citizens.95
Moreover, the district court acknowledged that foreign corporations
“are likewise barred from making contributions and expenditures prohibited
by [section] 441e(a).”96 The court, however, quickly backed off that senti-
ment in the very next sentence: “Because this case concerns individuals, we
have no occasion to analyze the circumstances under which a corporation
may be considered a foreign corporation for purposes of First Amendment
analysis.”97
The Bluman court probably backed off for a logistical reason: it is diffi-
cult to determine which corporations are foreign. Long gone are the days
when most corporations existed in a single state; now, extremely wealthy
international corporations proliferate.98 A corporation that does not do bus-
iness in the United States is indisputably a foreign corporation, but the clas-
sification gets murky when a foreign-owned corporation conducts business
in the United States—and murkier still when a foreign corporation parents a
domestic subsidiary. Citizens United, nonetheless, created this questionable
legal landscape.
C. Disunited Citizens: The Fallout
Citizens United provoked the public; some applauded the decision as a
victory for speech rights while others condemned it for opening U.S. politics
to foreign corruption. Senator McConnell said the decision “struck a blow
91. Id. at 286–87 (collecting cases).
92. Id. at 287 (collecting cases).
93. Id. (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984)).
94. Id. at 288 (“It is fundamental to the definition of our national political community
that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional right to participate in, and thus may be
excluded from, activities of democratic self-government. It follows, therefore, that the United
States has a compelling interest for purposes of First Amendment analysis in limiting the
participation of foreign citizens in activities of American democratic self-government, and in
thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S. political process.”)
95. See 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
96. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 n.4. Congress is reasonably concerned about both
foreign and corporate corruption individually, so the worry escalates when those two concerns
combine.
97. Id.
98. Nayan Chanda, Globalinc: An Atlas of the Multinational Corporation, YaleGlobal
Online (2003) (book review), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/globalinc.jsp. Not only are
fifty-three of the top 100 companies multinational corporations, but also there are over 63,000
multinational corporations with 821,000 subsidiaries. Id.
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for the First Amendment.”99 Former Federal Election Commissioner Hans
von Spakovsky agreed, “[t]he Supreme Court has restored a part of the First
Amendment that had been unfortunately stolen by Congress and a previ-
ously wrongly-decided ruling of the [C]ourt.”100 Others did not see the deci-
sion as such a victory. Although the decision leaves section 441e facially
intact,101 critics feared otherwise. In his 2010 State of the Union address,
President Obama explained, “last week the Supreme Court reversed a cen-
tury of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests—
including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”102
Obama added, “I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by
America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities.”103 Justice
Alito, in response, famously suggested Obama was wrong, mouthing “not
true.”104 Analysts “cautioned that the fear was being overblown” because,
although now possible, “foreign companies would be reluctant to dabble in
U.S. politics.”105 Nonetheless, partially driven by the fear of foreign corrup-
tion in the aftermath of the Citizens United ruling, Obama and Congress
sought to pass campaign finance reform legislation.
Congress has attempted to combat the effects of Citizens United several
times. For example, Congress drafted the sweeping Democracy is Strength-
ened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections (DISCLOSE) Act.106 Con-
gress intended the Act to generally boost disclosure requirements.107 It would
have banned domestic subsidiaries from contributing in certain circum-
stances: (1) if a foreign national owns 20 percent or more of the voting
shares, (2) if foreign nationals comprise a majority of the board of directors,
or (3) if a foreign national controls the corporation’s decisionmaking
process with respect to its interests in the United States or its activities in
99. Greg Stohr, Corporate Campaign Spending Backed by U.S. High Court, Bloomberg
(Jan. 21, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aU.fso
rJbt3E.
100. Stephen Dinan, Divided Court Strikes Down Campaign Money Restrictions, Wash.
Times, (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/21/divided-court-
strikes-down-campaign-money-restrict/.
101. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
102. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
103. Id.
104. Neil Nagraj, Justice Alito Mouths ‘Not True’ When Obama Blasts Supreme Court Ruling
in State of the Union Address, N.Y. Daily News (Jan. 28, 2010, 11:09 AM), http://www
.nydailynews.com/news/politics/justice-alito-mouths-not-true-obama-blasts-supreme-court-
ruling-state-union-address-article-1.194197.
105. Josh Gerstein, Decision May Mean More Foreign Cash, Politico (Jan. 21, 2010, 10:28
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31845.html. Moreover, some argue that for-
eign participation in U.S. politics would not be problematic. See id. (quoting Professor Dorf);
see also Friedman, supra note 19.
106. See DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010).
107. Id.
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connection with elections.108 When Republicans blocked the bill from pass-
ing,109 Democrats annually reintroduced the bill.110 Another effort involved
dropping the most contested provisions from the bill to ensure that at least
the foreign corporation loophole would be closed.111 Congress, however, did
not adopt any of these measures.112
Since those measures were not enacted, an FEC advisory opinion issued
prior to Citizens United best illustrates the current state of campaign finance
law on domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations. Subsidiaries of foreign
corporations that are incorporated and have principal places of business do-
mestically are not foreign nationals under section 441e.113 The FEC “found
no evidence of Congressional intent to broaden the prohibition on foreign
national involvement in U.S. elections to cover U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
corporations.”114 Thus, domestic subsidiaries may participate.115 The advi-
sory opinion nonetheless set forth two conditions that remain good law.
Domestic subsidiaries of foreign parents may donate if “(1) the donations
and disbursements derive entirely from funds generated by the [domestic
subsidiary’s] operations; and (2) all decisions concerning the donations and
disbursements will be made by individuals who are U.S. citizens or perma-
nent residents.”116 Unfortunately, other than good faith, little prevents cor-
porations from skirting these requirements and illegally participating in U.S.
politics.
II. Acquiring Political Access
Just as campaign finance law loosened over time in relation to corpora-
tions, corporate law became increasingly more relaxed, and as a conse-
quence, increasingly transnational. As early as 2006, experts predicted
108. Id. § 102. The DISCLOSE Act passed in the House but the Senate blocked its passage.
Albaugh, supra note 48, at 290.
109. Albaugh, supra note 48, at 290–91.
110. See S. 2516, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. 148, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 2219, 112th Cong.
(2012).
111. See Ethics in Foreign Lobby Act, H.R. 195, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing prohibit-
ing PACs with majority foreign ownership); American Elections Act, S. 2959, 111th Cong.
(2010) (proposing similar foreign prohibitions as the original DISCLOSE Act); America is for
Americans Act, H.R. 4510, 111th Cong. (2010) (proposing similar foreign prohibitions as the
original DISCLOSE Act); Prohibiting Foreign Influence in American Elections Act, H.R. 4522,
111th Cong. (2010) (proposing harsher restrictions prohibiting any subsidiary of a foreign
parent from contributing).
112. See Albaugh, supra note 48, at 291.
113. See Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Opinion 2006-15, at 4 (May 19, 2006), http://
saos.fec.gov/aodocs/2006-15.pdf.
114. Id. at 3.
115. See id. at 2–3.
116. Id. at 2.
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increasing “cross-border deals as a result of an increasingly supportive regu-
latory, political and market environment.”117 Transaction costs for interna-
tional mergers and acquisitions118 have drastically declined.119
Unsurprisingly, global deal volume has reached the highest level since
2007.120 As global transactions explode, and the campaign finance law gov-
erning domestic subsidiaries remains untouched, the prohibition on for-
eign-corporate campaign participation is subject to loopholes. This Part
explains how corporations may behave through mergers and acquisitions,
with few organizational checks or external barriers, enabling foreign corpo-
rations to illegally participate in U.S. politics.
Corporations are not free to merge and acquire as their boards see fit.
Although the legal environment is increasingly supportive of these transac-
tions,121 the law does not take a completely laissez-faire approach. Mergers
and acquisitions are complex, and they can implicate areas of law like securi-
ties, tax, compensation, and competition.122 In the case of public corpora-
tions, although boards have tremendous power, some mergers and
acquisitions must be approved by a shareholder vote.123
Although shareholder approval may seem like a major check against
mergers and acquisitions, the requirement does little to prevent a potential
politically motivated transaction.124 A substantial collective action problem
hinders shareholders from voting against board-suggested transactions.125
Consequently, shareholder passivity is almost inevitable.126 Consider, for ex-
ample, a shareholder with a 1 percent stake in a corporation. The corpora-
tion is considering a politically motivated transaction that will ultimately
decrease corporate wealth. Assume it will cost the shareholder $10,000 to
inform herself and the other shareholders that the transaction is bad. If she
cannot convince a majority of the shareholders to vote the transaction
117. Jonathan Feiler, International Mergers & Acquisitions, in Developments in Banking and
Financial Law: 2005, 25 Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 1, 81, 81 (2006).
118. This Note does not attempt to distinguish between different types of mergers and
acquisitions. The loophole exists regardless of how the corporations conduct the transaction.
119. See Michael S. Jacobs, Symposium, Foreword: Mergers and Acquisitions in a Global
Economy: Perspectives from Law, Politics, and Business, 13 DePaul Bus. L.J. 1, 3 (2001).
120. See Soyoung Kim & Greg Roumeliotis, Global M&A at Seven-Year High as Big Corpo-
rate Deals Return, Reuters (June 30, 2014, 12:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
06/30/us-deals-m-a-idUSKBN0F50A920140630 (“Year-to-date global deal volume as of June
26 surged to $1.75 trillion, up 75 percent from the year-ago period . . . . That was the highest
level since 2007, when deal volume reached $2.28 trillion.”).
121. See Jacobs, supra note 119, at 3.
122. William T. Allen et al., Commentaries and Cases on the Law of Business
Organization 453 n.2 (4th ed. 2012).
123. Id. at 153, 460 (“Today, the merger is the most prominent among a handful of corpo-
rate decisions that require shareholder approval.”).
124. This Note uses “politically motivated transaction” as a term of art to mean any cor-
porate transaction designed to enable a foreign corporation access to U.S. politics.
125. Allen et al., supra note 122, at 154.
126. Id. at 154–55.
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down, she loses her $10,000 investment and her 1 percent share of the cor-
porate loss from the bad transaction. Even if she can convince the share-
holders to vote it down, it would have to save the corporation at least
$1,000,000 before she would even recuperate her investment. If it might save
less, like $500,000, even though there will be a large corporate loss, the 1
percent shareholder would rather bear her share of the loss ($5,000) than
spend $10,000 in an effort to prevent it.
Additionally, corporations can typically skirt shareholder affirmation. A
triangular merger can “be used to circumvent the voting and appraisal rights
of the acquiring company’s shareholders.”127 In such a merger, the acquirer
capitalizes a subsidiary and merges its subsidiary with the target corpora-
tion.128 Generally, because the acquirer is not a party to the merger, the
acquirer’s shareholders do not get to vote on the merger.129 Moreover, if the
target corporation is small enough that the cost of the merger is below cer-
tain thresholds, there need not be a shareholder vote.130
The above hypothetical assumed that the transaction would be bad for
corporate wealth. But corporations seeking to influence politics almost inev-
itably do so in their corporate self-interest.131 Influencing politics is a way for
corporations to seek economic advantage and increase wealth. Transactions
that increase corporate wealth should not worry the shareholders.132 Even if
shareholders are presented with a politically motivated transaction, they are
likely more interested in maximizing their profits than preventing their or-
ganization from corrupting the political process.133 Because the organiza-
tional checks are meant to protect shareholders and politically motivated
transactions benefit shareholders, these checks will not prevent a corpora-
tion from participating in the political process.
127. 1 Robert B. Thompson, O’Neal and Thompson’s Oppression of Minority
Shareholders & LLC Members § 5:6 (Supp. 2014).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(f) (2011).
131. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1423 (1993) (“Shareholder wealth
maximization long has been the fundamental norm which guides U.S. corporate
decisionmakers.”).
132. See id. (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders. . . . The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or
to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other pur-
poses.” (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919))).
133. Cf. Inverse Logic, The Economist, Sept. 20, 2014, at 71. A new trend called tax
inversions finds that some U.S. corporations merge with foreign corporations to reduce their
U.S. tax obligations. Id. While the U.S. taxes income regardless of where it is earned, “every
other large rich country taxes only income earned within its borders.” How to Stop the Inver-
sion Perversion, The Economist, July 26, 2014, at 12. By merging and moving their headquar-
ters abroad, former U.S. corporations become domestic subsidiaries of foreign corporations to
reduce taxes. See Inverse Logic, supra. Shareholders welcome their increased wealth in the form
of lower taxes, even though it comes at the cost of what some believe to be corporations
“renounc[ing] their U.S. ‘citizenship.’ ” E.g., Americans for Tax Fairness, Corporate Tax
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Corporations must also pass external barriers to conduct a politically
motivated transaction. Although external barriers to international mergers
and acquisitions exist, they were not designed to prevent politically moti-
vated transactions. Competition law bars “corporate behavior that might
undermine consumer welfare.”134 Foreign-corporation involvement in the
political process could easily undermine consumer welfare. Foreign involve-
ment might lead, for example, to lax regulations on imports from the for-
eign corporation that ultimately injure consumers. Competition law,
however, is entirely uninterested in campaign finance.135 Rather, competition
law focuses on whether a transaction will undermine consumer welfare by
causing diminished competition.136 To that end, in the United States the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires notifica-
tion and premerger approval.137 Notification and approval requirements al-
low regulators to find and prevent any transactions that undermine
consumer welfare.138
Yet in practice, preventing a transaction for anticompetitive reasons is
very difficult.139 As the number of transactions occurring continues to in-
crease, monitoring transactions for potential competition issues has become
harder.140 Even if competition law cared about politically motivated transac-
tions, regulators are so overloaded with applications that they would not
have the resources to prevent such transactions.
Inversions 10, http://www.americansfortaxfairness.org/files/7-ATF-Corporate-Tax-Inver-
sions-fact-sheet.pdf. If shareholders applaud tax inversions even though they reduce the gov-
ernment’s budget, it is not a stretch to say they would not mind the potential corruption of the
political process if it means more wealth.
134. Aditi Bagchi, The Political Economy of Merger Regulation, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 5
(2005).
135. Although the hypothetical example fits—corporate behavior that undermines con-
sumer welfare—the transaction would not necessarily facially implicate competition law. A
politically motivated transaction can easily avoid competition law issues. For example, a for-
eign oil corporation seeking access to U.S. politics can acquire a domestic subsidiary in a
different industry to eschew anticompetitive concerns. Although subsequent corruption could
enable anticompetitive practices in the oil industry and undermine consumer welfare, the
transaction itself was not anticompetitive. Perhaps the connection between the transaction and
the anticompetitive consequences is too attenuated. Compare the above transaction to a mo-
nopolistic merger designed to decrease consumer choice and increase corporate control of the
market; the latter directly implicates competition law.
136. See Bagchi, supra note 134, at 5.
137. Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383, 1390 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a (2012)).
138. See Kenneth J. Hamner, Comment, The Globalization of Law: International Merger
Control and Competition Law in the United States, the European Union, Latin America and
China, 11 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 385, 392 (2002).
139. See Bagchi, supra note 134, at 19–20 (“[T]he advanced economic integration of the
United States, as well as the truly national structure of the federal government, limit both the
incentive and the ability of states to push a highly interventionist merger policy that would
work to the advantage of various local interests.”).
140. Jacobs, supra note 119, at 5–6.
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Few extra barriers to international transactions exist. International
transactions almost doubled from 1992 to 2001, and the value of those
transactions increased almost tenfold.141 In 2001, 31.9 percent of closed deals
involved both a U.S. and a foreign company.142 Cross-border transactions
inherently involve multiple jurisdictions, requiring them to comply with
multiple regulatory regimes.143 Nonetheless, a politically motivated transac-
tion can avoid running afoul of competition laws no matter how many juris-
dictions’ laws apply.144
While competition law can halt cross-border transactions based on an-
ticompetitive outcomes, Congress also empowers the executive to prohibit
unwanted foreign influence and investment and even reverse completed
transactions.145 President Reagan delegated the authority to the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS).146 The CFIUS has broad discre-
tionary authority to preclude international transactions that threaten or im-
pair national security.147 Although the CFIUS could find that foreign
political corruption meets that standard, it is similarly uninterested in pro-
tecting campaign finance.148 Instead, the CFIUS focuses almost exclusively
on national defense.149 Even though the CFIUS is a logical fit to protect
against politically motivated transactions, the transactions are likely to be
ignored unless they involve issues like defense or energy.150 A politically mo-
tivated transaction can thus evade CFIUS review, just as it evades review
under competition law. Because these external barriers were not designed to
prevent politically motivated transactions, corporations can transact with
relative ease.
As barriers are virtually nonexistent for politically motivated transac-
tions, clever foreign corporations can access the campaign finance market-
place at will.151 Only nominal barriers exist for a foreign corporation to
141. Matthew C. Franker, Note, Restoration: International Merger Review in the Wake of
General Electric/Honeywell and the Triumphant Return of Negative Comity, 36 Geo. Wash.
Int’l L. Rev. 877, 879 (2004).
142. Id.
143. Id. (“Currently, more than ninety states have enacted some form of competition law
regime and more than twenty are in the process of drafting such laws.”). See generally Hamner,
supra note 138 (providing overview of different competition law regimes).
144. See supra note 135.
145. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012).
146. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988).
147. Kristy E. Young, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the
Foreign Investment and National Securities Act of 2007: A Delicate Balancing Act that Needs
Revision, 15 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 43, 46 (2008).
148. Cf. supra note 135 and accompanying text.
149. Young, supra note 147, at 47–48.
150. See id. at 57–60.
151. Meanwhile, people do not have these same abilities. Take, for example, the plaintiffs
in Bluman. Although they lived and worked in the U.S., they had no right to contribute.
Obviously they could not merge with a U.S. citizen to participate in politics. See supra notes
87–90 and accompanying text.
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merge with or acquire a domestic subsidiary. All domestic corporations (in-
cluding those subsidiaries) can participate in campaign finance as a conse-
quence of Citizens United. Should a foreign parent guide a domestic
subsidiary toward political participation in the parent’s interest, it could cor-
rupt U.S. politics. And although the law technically prohibits parent compa-
nies from influencing campaign contributions made by subsidiaries,152 the
practice remains prevalent throughout corporate law.153 If a foreign parent
dominates a domestic subsidiary’s decision to donate, this creates a loop-
hole—law is broken and politics corrupted, but voters are none the wiser.
III. Fighting Foreign-Corporate Influence
As described in Part II, foreign corporations can easily acquire and in-
fluence domestic subsidiaries with little accountability or supervision. As de-
scribed in Part I, the current campaign finance regime allows those domestic
subsidiaries to spend on U.S. politics and elections with few limits. Thus, a
loophole in the BCRA results: foreign corporations can influence U.S. polit-
ics through their domestic subsidiaries. Justice Stevens sarcastically feared
that the law “appear[s] to afford the same protection to multinational cor-
porations controlled by foreigners as to individual Americans: To do other-
wise, after all, could ‘enhance the relative voice’ of some (i.e., humans) over
others (i.e., nonhumans).”154 Although merely ridiculing the potential of
equal protection for foreign-controlled multinational corporations and indi-
vidual Americans, Justice Stevens envisioned that Citizens United would en-
able foreign corporations to access U.S. politics. Discourse alone will not
resolve this issue; Congress must successfully legislate in this area. Although
several congressional efforts to close this loophole have recently failed,155
campaign finance reform is one of few areas in politics in which bipartisan
support may be possible.156 Congress should attack this problem from a dif-
ferent angle to achieve bipartisan support.
This Part proposes legislation that closes the loophole and provides en-
forcement measures. Congress should enact a law that prohibits domestic
subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations from participating in campaign
finance when the subsidiaries are dominated by the foreign parents. Section
152. See supra text accompanying note 116.
153. See John H. Matheson, Why Courts Pierce: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corpo-
rate Veil, 7 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 1, 29–32 tbl.8A (2010) (finding hundreds of cases involving
domination). Professor Matheson’s conclusions are limited to corporations that got caught
and sued. See id. at 10. It is impossible to ascertain how often wrongful subsidiary domination
goes unnoticed or unpunished.
154. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947–48 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 904 (majority opinion)).
155. See supra Section I.C.
156. For example, the last major overhaul of campaign finance was called the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Republican Senator John McCain and Democrat Senator Rus-
sell Feingold proposed and sponsored the Act. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.
December 2015] Fighting Foreign-Corporate Political Access 499
III.A analyzes how corporate veil-piercing theory should apply to the cam-
paign finance system. Section III.B argues that qui tam provisions would
reinforce the legislation by encouraging whistle-blowing to mitigate the en-
forcement difficulties that arise from inadequate resources and incentives.
A. Independence Equals Admission
Veil piercing is when a court rejects shareholders’ attempts to limit lia-
bility by hiding behind an intricate corporate structure.157 A clear under-
standing of the limited-liability rule is crucial to comprehend veil-piercing
doctrine. Limited liability is an important, historical function of corporate
law. The rule promotes investment by limiting liability to nothing more than
an investor’s original contribution.158 If liability (and risk) were unlimited,
growth would be stifled.159 Capitalist societies prefer policies that promote
investments rather than those that stifle growth. Thus, courts do not typi-
cally force shareholders to satisfy the unpaid debts of their corporations.
The limited-liability rule, however, has negative consequences. Some ex-
perts even argue that limited liability should not be the general rule.160 This
limited-liability-for-shareholders rule not only protects the individuals who
tinker in the stock market in their free time, but it also protects corporate
shareholders.161 Aspects of corporations allow for abuses: there is substantial
concern that companies “externalize the risks of their more jeopardous un-
dertakings by establishing subsidiaries” to shield themselves from liability.162
To remedy such concerns, scholars suggest imposing liability on entire enter-
prises, rather than just individual entities.163 Under such a liability theory,
for example, large enterprises would be unable to hide behind corporate
structure to avoid liability. Nevertheless, theories of enterprise liability ad-
vance slowly: state legislatures fear enacting such changes will negatively im-
pact business in their states, so they “provide[ ] the greatest degree of
limited liability” to avoid “corporate flight across state lines.”164 For states
wishing to compete in the race to the bottom, adopting new theories of
liability is not plausible.165
157. See, e.g., William J. Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 Ind. L. Rev.
421, 429–33 (1999).
158. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 89–90 (1985).
159. Id. at 90.
160. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1896–99 (1991) (advocating for a rule of pro rata share-
holder liability for tort damages a corporation fails to satisfy).
161. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 158, at 110–11.
162. Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
Conduct, 90 Yale L.J. 1, 71 (1980).
163. E.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, Symposium, The Transformation of Modern Corporation
Law: The Law of Corporate Groups, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 605, 605 (2005).
164. Rands, supra note 157, at 430.
165. Cf. supra text accompanying note 30.
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Veil-piercing doctrine allows courts to negate the limited-liability rule
and impose liability on shareholders in unusual cases.166 The doctrine pri-
marily applies in cases involving corporate shareholders.167 “[C]ourts regu-
larly disregard the entity when its separateness is used for illegitimate
purposes.”168 Prior to 1991, courts pierced the corporate veil in 237 of 637
cases (37.21 percent).169 The courts pierced the veil in 314 of 551 cases
(56.99 percent) in which the courts found the parent company dominated
the subsidiary.170 In a more efficient study from 2010, statistics demon-
strated that “[w]here courts found owner control/dominance . . . they
pierced 76.4% of the time and refused to pierce in the remaining 23.6% of
cases.”171 Veil piercing is a prevalent remedy to the limited-liability rule.
The doctrine, admittedly, remains maddeningly confusing.172 The most
notable formulation of the rule is the instrumentality test formulated by
Frederick J. Powell:
When the privilege of transacting business in corporate form has been ille-
gally abused to the injury of a third party, he may disregard the corporate
entity to the extent of holding the stockholders liable for the corporate
obligations to him. In this way a civil remedy is provided for an unjust
wrong or injury caused by the legal fiction of corporate entity.173
166. E.g., Rands, supra note 157, at 429–33. Imagine, for example, that a corporation finds
a high-risk, high-reward business opportunity making a product. It creates a wholly owned
subsidiary to pursue the opportunity. To keep costs low, the parent barely capitalizes the sub-
sidiary and guides it toward cutting corners in production. If the business is successful, the
parent, as full owner of the subsidiary, reaps the rewards. If, on the other hand, the cost-
cutting production measures cause a design defect in the product, severely injuring many
consumers, the subsidiary could face massive tort liability. Because the parent undercapitalized
the subsidiary, it could not afford the liability and would go bankrupt. Courts would be loath
to let the parent hide behind the veil of its corporate structure and the limited-liability rule.
This is especially true when the parent caused the problem in the first place by pressuring the
subsidiary to cut corners and undercapitalizing it. In this hypothetical, a court might pierce
the corporate veil to allow the tort victims to recover from the parent.
167. This Note’s discussion on corporate veil piercing is limited to parent and subsidiary
corporations.
168. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L.
Rev. 1036, 1041 (1991).
169. Id. at 1055.
170. Id. at 1063.
171. Matheson, supra note 153, at 32.
172. Thompson, supra note 168, at 1036–37 (“Legal writers have described judicial deci-
sions to pierce the veil as ‘irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible,’ ‘defy[ing] any at-
tempt at rational explanation,’ and occurring ‘freakishly.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural Problems in the Law
of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations 8 (1983); then quoting Jonathan M. Landers, A
Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary & Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev.
589, 620 (1975); and then quoting Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 158, at 89)).
173. Frederick J. Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations 6 (1931). An alterna-
tive approach uses the California jurisprudence on “alter ego.” See Rands, supra note 157, at
430–31. Adding to the confusion, if one tried to distinguish the two rule formulations, she
would likely be unsuccessful. Id. at 433 (“It is possible to try to draw distinctions between [the
‘alter ego’ test] and Powell’s ‘instrumentality’ analysis, but the consensus is that there is little
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Powell created a three-part test: (1) the “mere ‘instrumentality’ ” test, (2) the
injustice test, and (3) the “unjust loss or injury” test.174 The first part deter-
mines whether the parent completely controlled and dominated the subsidi-
ary.175 The second part determines whether the parent dominated the
subsidiary to commit a wrong.176 Finally, the third part determines whether
the wrong proximately caused an injury to the plaintiff.177 Powell listed sev-
eral factors relevant to determining whether the mere-instrumentality test is
satisfied.178
In applying veil-piercing doctrine to a situation in which a foreign par-
ent corporation required its domestic subsidiary to make campaign expendi-
tures, the test would have to be slightly modified. The third part should be
presumed if the first and second parts are satisfied. The second part would
be simple: assuming a parent dominated a subsidiary to make an expendi-
ture, the second part would be satisfied because the parent would illegally
gain indirect access to U.S. politics in violation of the BCRA.179 This illegal
access corrupts the electoral process, injuring the entire voting body. Al-
though the wrong does not injure any individual, a wrong against the gov-
ernment or the people should rationally substitute for an individual,
satisfying part three.180 This leaves part one of the test as the most salient—
has the parent completely dominated the subsidiary corporation to make an
expenditure?
Many courts and commentators have tried to identify how to determine
whether a parent controlled or dominated a subsidiary—the first prong of
the tripartite test.181 Professor Blumberg, a leading opponent of corporate
limited liability, lists several factors that frequently result in piercing the cor-
porate veil: the parent’s participation in day-to-day operations, the parent’s
role in making important policy or business decisions, instructions from the
parent company to the subsidiary, or use of parent personnel to conduct
difference between them. The verbal formulations are virtually indistinguishable as to analysis,
application, and result. They are often used by courts in the same sentence and should be
regarded as interchangeable.” (footnotes omitted)). This Note focuses solely on the instrumen-
tality analysis.
174. Powell, supra note 173, at 4–6.
175. Id. at 4–5.
176. Id. at 5–6.
177. Id. at 6.
178. The factors are: (1) the parent owns all or most of the subsidiary’s capital stock; (2)
the parent and subsidiary have interlocking directorates; (3) the parent finances the subsidiary;
(4) the parent incorporates the subsidiary or subscribes to all of its stock; (5) the subsidiary is
inadequately capitalized; (6) the parent pays the expenses of the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary
only conducts business with the parent and has none of its own assets; (8) the parent describes
the subsidiary as a department or division in its papers; (9) the parent uses the subsidiary’s
property as its own; (10) the subsidiary’s directors take orders from the parent and act in the
parent’s interest; and (11) the parent and subsidiary do not observe the formal legal require-
ments of the subsidiary. Id. at 9.
179. See 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 30121).
180. Qui tam provisions obviate the need for part three of the test. See infra Section III.B.
181. See, e.g., supra note 178.
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subsidiary affairs.182 Each court applies veil-piercing doctrine differently. For
example, the Second Circuit considers ten different factors,183 while the Sev-
enth Circuit considers eleven.184 This creates an incredibly volatile veil-pierc-
ing regime. Professor Bainbridge seeks to abolish veil piercing altogether,
arguing that the “present state of veil piercing doctrine allows judges to im-
pose their own brand of rough justice without being overly concerned with
precedent or appellate review.”185
Corporate veil-piercing doctrine nonetheless provides a useful analytical
framework for determining whether the subsidiary or the parent company is
actually making an expenditure. Unlike the failed legislation that formalisti-
cally sought to preclude subsidiaries from making expenditures based on a
foreign-involvement percentage threshold, veil-piercing doctrine would pre-
clude only the expenditures actually made by the foreign parent. Moreover,
in the campaign finance context, a veil piercing would not subject the parent
to the debts of the subsidiary; the doctrine would not butt its head against
the rule of limited liability. Instead, courts could use the doctrine, and par-
ticularly the domination test, to preclude foreign participation in domestic
elections. Prohibiting foreign participation in campaign finance is dramati-
cally different than unexpectedly applying liability to shareholders. Thus,
Bainbridge and others’ criticism of the doctrine is inapplicable.186
Additionally, the test will be easier to apply to campaign finance than it
is in most traditional veil-piercing contexts. In the campaign finance con-
text, the domination test need not incorporate all of the factors of the vari-
ous existing tests. For example, mere ownership does not show
domination.187 A foreign parent with 80 percent ownership of a domestic
subsidiary might have no interest in U.S. politics. Meanwhile, a foreign par-
ent with a small ownership stake might nonetheless seek to dominate the
subsidiary to make expenditures. Again, “the use of the same work force and
business offices for both corporations”188 would not be a relevant concern.
182. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems of Parent
and Subsidiary Corporations Under Statutory Law of General Application 42–46
(1989).
183. Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In deter-
mining whether ‘complete control’ exists, we have considered such factors as: (1) disregard of
corporate formalities; (2) inadequate capitalization; (3) intermingling of funds; (4) overlap in
ownership, officers, directors, and personnel; (5) common office space, address and telephone
numbers of corporate entities; (6) the degree of discretion shown by the allegedly dominated
corporation; (7) whether the dealings between the entities are at arms length; (8) whether the
corporations are treated as independent profit centers; (9) payment or guarantee of the corpo-
ration’s debts by the dominating entity, and (10) intermingling of property between the
entities.”).
184. See C M Corp. v. Oberer Dev. Co., 631 F.2d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 1980).
185. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. Corp. L. 479, 515 (2001).
186. See id. at 506–14.
187. See Rands, supra note 157, at 435.
188. See Johnson v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir. 1987).
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If, on the other hand, the parent controls the subsidiary’s bank account,
out of which an expenditure is paid, the veil-piercing framework would sug-
gest that the parent dominates the subsidiary and that the expenditure
should be precluded.189 Some of the most relevant factors would be “disre-
gard of corporate formalities,” “inadequate capitalization,” “intermingling
of funds,” or “payment or guarantee of the corporation’s debts by the domi-
nating entity.”190 Other circumstances surrounding the parent–subsidiary
relationship would also be salient. For example, if a foreign parent acquires a
domestic subsidiary in the midst of an election and the subsidiary immedi-
ately contributes to a campaign, that could indicate that the foreign parent
directed the contribution.191 Courts can trim and strengthen the test, look-
ing only to the relevant factors.
B. Blowing the Whistle on Foreign Corruption
Qui tam, short for qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se imposo sequitur,
means “who brings the action as well for the king as for himself.”192 In a qui
tam action, a “right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by statute is
frequently given to the first common informer who brings the action, al-
though he has no interest in the matter whatever except as such in-
former.”193 Qui tam provisions authorize citizens to litigate issues and share
in the recovery to supplement actions by federal officials.194
To provide for effective enforcement of the veil-piercing doctrine in
campaign finance, the proposed legislation should include a qui tam provi-
sion. Congress should model the legislation after the False Claims Act
(FCA), which introduced qui tam.195 The FCA, enacted during the Civil
War, combated fraud in defense procurement during a time in which the
Union was outnumbered.196 Like defense spending, potential for fraud in
corporate campaign finance has significantly grown since the Civil War.197
To combat this ever-present issue, Congress designed the FCA to allow pri-
vate attorneys general to bring suit, warning the government of fraud.198
Then, the government proceeds with the action, dismisses the action, or
189. See Consol. Sun Ray, Inc. v. Oppenstein, 335 F.2d 801, 806–08 (8th Cir. 1964).
190. Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1997).
191. See Miller, supra note 3.
192. Bass Anglers Sportsman’s Soc’y of Am. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324
F. Supp. 302, 305 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
193. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
194. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 Yale L.J.
341, 350 (1989).
195. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
196. Brian D. Howe, Note, Conflicting Requirements of Notice: The Incorporation of Rule
9(b) into the False Claims Act’s First-to-File Bar, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 559, 560 (2015).
197. See Ni Qian, Note, Necessary Evils: How to Stop Worrying and Love Qui Tam, 2013
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 594, 606–07. Likewise, potential for fraud rapidly increases along with
government spending on healthcare. See id. at 625.
198. See Howe, supra note 196, at 563.
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allows the private citizen to proceed.199 As an award for whistle-blowing, the
original plaintiff wins a percentage of the civil remedy, depending on the
effort contributed to prosecuting the claim (that is, whether the government
or original plaintiff proceeds with the action).200
The FCA has exposed corporate frauds for over a century. In past years,
it has returned three billion dollars to the federal government annually.201
From October 1987 to September 2013, plaintiffs brought more than 9,000
new qui tam cases under the FCA.202 During that time the government and
private citizens recovered almost $39 billion.203 Now that number has almost
certainly been eclipsed. The qui tam provisions were instrumental; given
limited resources, the government could not have been as successful if it had
to prosecute these claims alone. About 70 percent ($27 billion) of the recov-
ery came from qui tam actions.204 Without these provisions to incentivize
whistle-blowing, the government would have recovered only about $12 bil-
lion.205 For their assistance, the private citizens were rewarded handsomely,
earning over $4 billion.206
In the foreign-corporate campaign contribution context, a qui tam pro-
vision would allow enforcement, despite a lack of resources and incentives.
Unlike the typical veil-piercing case, in which a private litigator has been
wronged in contract or tort and brings the action to recover damages, in a
campaign finance case, the general public is injured. The wrong would not
necessarily motivate private attorneys to litigate it. Admittedly, the benefici-
ary’s opponents would be motivated to litigate questionable donations, and
the FEC, charged with enforcing the campaign finance laws, would also be
motivated to litigate. Due to limited resources, however, neither is likely to
attempt to understand the corporate structure involved, much less pierce the
corporate veil.207 Many consider the FEC a “weak and ineffective agency un-
able to fulfill its mandate.”208 And while potential scandals might incentivize
the benefited campaign to reject these expenditures, lackadaisical disclosure
requirements209 significantly reduce the threat of scandals.
199. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c).
200. Id. § 3730(d).
201. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1244, 1246 (2012).






207. Cf. Amanda S. La Forge, Comment, The Toothless Tiger—Structural, Political and
Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 Admin. L.J.
Am. U. 351, 352, 357 (1996).
208. Id. at 352.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 107–112.
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Despite the tremendous success of qui tam, many still worry about it.
“Critics . . . paint qui tam as a litigation regime run amok.”210 Congress
intentionally designed qui tam recoveries to include high penalties so bring-
ing the actions would be attractive to plaintiffs, but these penalties “place[ ]
great pressure on defendants to settle even meritless suits.”211 Unsurpris-
ingly, there is a whistleblower bar with about 200 lawyers.212 The penalties
also make it better for potential whistleblowers to “report[ ] on bad behav-
ior” “after silently watching it take place under their noses,” instead of reme-
dying it, which incentivizes bad conduct.213 The FCA essentially created a
new career: the professional whistleblower.214 But these evils appear neces-
sary to remedy greater evils.215
In the campaign finance context, qui tam provisions similar to those in
the FCA would help stifle illegal involvement in politics by foreign corpora-
tions. If the FEC is unable to investigate an expenditure made by a subsidi-
ary, a private citizen may take up the prosecution, allowing better
enforcement of the prohibition. This provision would provide underpaid
campaign staff a better incentive to report. Qui tam provisions would also
increase the threat of scandals, forcing campaigns to be more careful about
accepting donations. Although politics might never be completely free from
the possibility of corruption, this legislation would make great strides to-
ward restoring political protections and closing one of the most evasive
loopholes in campaign finance law.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court determined that the First Amendment bars Con-
gress from prohibiting corporate speech in political campaigns. Although
prohibitions on foreign speech remain constitutional, foreign corporations
can skirt this prohibition and illegally donate to politics by acquiring and
dominating a domestic subsidiary. This type of corruption is prevalent. Take
for example, Cheong Am, a foreign corporation that used a domestic subsid-
iary to attempt to influence President Clinton.216 To combat this potential
corruption without destroying domestic subsidiaries’ free speech rights,
Congress should apply the corporate veil-piercing framework to domestic
subsidiary contributions and enforce the legal regime with a qui tam
provision.
210. Engstrom, supra note 201, at 1247.
211. John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Symposium, Why Thompson Is Wrong: Misuse of
the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1999).
212. Neil Weinberg, The Dark Side of Whistleblowing, Forbes (Mar. 14, 2005, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0314/090.html.
213. Id.
214. See Engstrom, supra note 201, at 1249–50.
215. See Qian, supra note 197, at 601–02; see also Engstrom, supra note 201, at 1249–50
(“Critics . . . it seems, have it mostly wrong.”).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 1–8.
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